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Abstract 
 
In this paper I question whether the plea for depathologisation and the regaining of our ex-
propriated subjectivity from its psy and neuro-colonization is, in fact, not itself enmeshed 
with the notion of some real core of the human being, and thus amenable to some or an-
other Academic discipline and praxis. Critics of mainstream (neuro)psychology could unwit-
tingly, then, join the strong but unacknowledged undercurrent in today‘s neuropsy-
discourses to restore the subject as a fully fleshed-out agent; one who is situated beyond 
pathology, beyond abnormal and normal. I juxtapose this observation with critical readings 
of an artistic project looking to revalue subjectivity in the aftermath of a mining disaster, 
and the popular Theory of Mind-approach. In conclusion, I argue that an understanding of 
the subject as caught between subjectivation and de-subjectivation (where subjectivity be-
comes a social and a political issue) could allow us to rethink the terms of normality and pa-
thology. 
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Resumen  
En este artículo pregunto si el alegato de despatologización y la recuperación de nuestra 
subjetividad —expropiada por su colonización de las ciencias psi y neuro— está, de hecho,  
enredado con la noción de algún núcleo real del ser humano, y de esta manera, sensible a 
alguna otra disciplina o práctica. Las críticas de la (neuro)psicología mainstream pueden, 
involuntariamente, unirse a los discursos actuales de la neuropsi —no reconocidos y a con-
tracorriente— para recuperar el sujeto como un agente completo; un sujeto situado más 
allá de la patología, más allá de lo normal y anormal. Yuxtapongo esta posición con lectu-
ras críticas de un proyecto artístico que busca reevaluar la subjetividad a raíz de un desas-
tre minero, y el popular enfoque de la teoría de la mente. En conclusión, sostengo que un 
entendimiento del sujeto atrapado entre la subjetivación y la desubjetivación (donde la 
subjetividad se entiende como un asunto político y social) nos permite repensar los térmi-
nos de normalidad y patología. 
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Figure 1. Psychology is on the streets and is made by the people. 
 
La psicología está en la calle y la hacen 
los pueblos 
Psychology is on the streets and is made by 
the people: thus ran a slogan of Chilean psy-
chology students during a protest in 2012 
which expressed, both, their dissatisfaction 
with the actual reality of psychology in Chile 
and their hope for a better, dignified and just 
society (Lunes 16: Convocatoria Organización 
Estudiantes de Psicología a Asamblea Abierta, 
2012. See figure 1). At first glance, one can, 
of course, express nothing but sympathy with 
this slogan and support for the students‘ 
cause, as it rightfully reacts against an acad-
emicised ivory-tower version of psychology 
that operates in ―blessed indifference‖ of the 
real world. And, indeed, we all recognise the 
unworldly, and other-worldly, perspective 
and agenda of the large majority of experi-
mental, clinical, occupational psychology and 
the like whose shield of neutral objectivity 
leaves the researchers blind and deaf to the 
true solicitudes and concerns of real people. 
However, when formulated in such essential-
ist terms the image rapidly gets complicated. 
Indeed, who are those who leave the campus 
and go out onto the streets to meet real peo-
ple? Do they not risk, for example, through 
their very commitment to value ―el saber del 
pueblo‖ (the knowledge of the people), act-
ing like some kind of alien body snatchers ex-
propriating this knowledge and turning it into 
academic currency? At the very least, the 
pre-supposition that there is a psychology out 
there, that there is a psychological agent on 
the street, that there is a psychology tout-
court, is perhaps one that should be ques-
tioned, as such a perspective closely mimics 
the dominant view within Academia itself. 
And if one will allow me to pursue this meta-
critique from another perspective still: does 
such a slogan really get to the crux of the 
problem with current mainstream psychology? 
Is not in fact the case, rather, that there is 
already too much psychology and psycholo-
gists in the streets, in the schools, in the me-
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dia, in the work place, in politics, in one 
word, in society as such? Just consider how 
our schools are on the verge of becoming 
therapy centres where access to education is 
precisely a DSM-label, the stamp of one or 
another pathology. That said, should the real 
plea of protestation not in fact be to keep 
psychology and psychologists out of the 
streets and let people get on with doing what 
they do? Such a protest would be tantamount 
to a call to reclaim the streets, in a gesture 
analogous to the religious imagery of cleans-
ing the temple of the money traders: let us 
do away with all these psy-experts, these 
vampires that parasitically feed off everyday 
life. And above all else, let us do away with 
the pathologisation of everyday life, as the 
psy-complex uses the label of disor-
der/abnormality as a means for asserting con-
trol and power. 
However, is this plea for depathologisation 
and regaining of our expropriated subjectivity 
and our very humanness against the psy and 
neuro-colonization, in turn, itself not still 
enmeshed with the notion of some pure, tan-
gible and real core of the human being, one 
which would be, in the end, again amenable 
to some or another Academic discipline and 
praxis? This troublesome aspect of the de-
pathologisation argument becomes readily 
visible within Francis Fukuyama‘s (of all peo-
ple) criticism of the cult of self-esteem pro-
moted by pop-psychology and Big Pharma: 
The normal, and morally acceptable, way of 
overcoming low self-esteem was to struggle with 
oneself and with others, to work hard, to endure 
sometimes painful sacrifices, and finally to rise 
and be seen as having done so. The problem with 
self-esteem as it is understood in American pop 
psychology is that it becomes an entitlement, 
something everyone needs to have whether it is 
deserved or not. This devalues self-esteem and 
makes the quest for it self-defeating. But now 
along comes the American pharmaceutical indus-
try, which through drugs like Zoloft and Prozac 
can provide self-esteem in a bottle by elevating 
brain serotonin (quoted in Žižek, 2004, p. 130). 
Henceforth, is it back to the streets, back to 
the real stuff, back to nature –and thus more 
and more problematic terms come in– back to 
hard work, back to normality…? Paradoxically, 
then, the main argument against pathologisa-
tion and its strict division of normal and ab-
normal appears essentially bound up with the 
issue of what constitutes normality itself! 
Think in this respect of a typical critique of 
ADHD-labelling: let us act normal once again, 
so the reasoning goes, we should not under-
stand boys with hectic, edgy or difficult be-
haviour in terms of disorders; for this is noth-
ing but normal behaviour. A plea for de-
pathologisation thus, ultimately, risks turning 
into a naïve humanist, naturalizing, and even 
conservative discourse. 
We will know less and less what it 
means to be human 
To add to the foregoing one final turn of the 
screw: the plea for depathologisation is actu-
ally, and paradoxically, not that far removed 
from mainstream discourses within the con-
temporary (neuro)psy-disciplines themselves. 
For example, in a 2007 survey of members of 
the International Society for the Study of Per-
sonality Disorders and the Association for Re-
search on Personality Disorders, 80% of the 
respondents agreed that ―personality disor-
ders are better understood as variants of 
normal personality than as categorical disease 
entities‖ (Bernstein, Iscan, & Maser, 2007, p. 
542). Consequently, it is perhaps a miscon-
ception to think that the hallmark of current 
mainstream neuropsy-dicourses is a strict di-
vide between normality and abnormality. 
In their critique of the mediatisation of the 
neurosciences, for example, Cliodhna 
O'Connor, Geraint Rees & Hoffe Joffe mention 
two opposite tendencies: that is, firstly, to 
ground ―abnormality‖ in the brains; and sec-
ondly, seemingly in opposition, to deconstruct 
the normal/abnormal split. In regards to the 
latter, they point to the application of the 
terminology of addiction to a wide range of 
everyday behavioural domains, such as shop-
ping, computers, sex, chocolate, exercise, 
adventure sports, and sunbathing (O'Connor, 
Rees, & Joffe, 2012). If everything is ground-
ed in the brain, the normal and even what we 
consider as abnormal, then the strict bounda-
ry between these two gets blurred: they be-
come but two variants of the natural. 
O‘Connor et al., however, attribute this dou-
ble bind regarding the divide of normality and 
abnormality to the media‘s 
(mis)understanding of the neuroscientific data 
–an argument which could be immediately 
questioned: do not the media only exemplify 
and magnify what is already present in neuro-
science itself (see De Vos, forthcoming)? Be 
that as it may, in their attempt to rescue an 
alleged pure neuroscience from mediatisation 
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and its distortions, they actually claim an ab-
solute neutral objectivity. Is this not, then, 
the ultimate deconstruction of the nor-
mal/abnormal divide? For the neutral scien-
tist, then, regardless of whether they are 
studying paedophilia, eating chocolate or go-
ing shopping, it‘s all in the brain; no moral 
value to be attached here. As such science 
does not concern itself with delineating, mor-
ally or ethically speaking, the normal from 
the abnormal. But, also, at the functional, bi-
ological level there is no understanding of 
such a concept as functional normality; as 
Ron Amundson contends, current biology does 
not imply a distinction between normal and 
abnormal function (Amundson, 2000). What 
we call pathology is just another mode of 
functioning, an adaptation to certain circum-
stances, which in the end, is exactly the same 
as that in which we call normality. 
This is why in the neuropsy-sphere one is not 
overly concerned when big brain lesions are 
not found in conditions such as ADHD, autism 
or PTSD. Overall, one is quite happy talking 
about some brain regions being more or less 
involved in certain circumstances, or pointing 
to the delicate balances at the chemical lev-
el: in other words, the difference between 
normal/abnormal is far from absolutely estab-
lished. This is why in the psy-sciences it is 
generally agreed upon that the divide is arbi-
trary. As the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders) is based upon the 
establishment of certain agreed upon thresh-
olds which are to draw the line, one could ar-
gue that the DSM is actually a deconstruction 
of the difference between normality and ab-
normality. Hence, critics of the DSM who ar-
gue that a diagnosis of a disorder should ex-
press a ―continuum with normal personality 
functioning‖ (Widiger & Costa, 2012, p. 1481) 
are actually in line with the DSM itself. One 
could even argue that the inflation of DMS-
labels –as they proliferate in everyday life, 
incorporating sadness, grief etcetera into the 
DSM-listings (Kinderman, Read, Moncrieff, & 
Bentall, 2013)— boils down to a gradual de-
construction of the split between normal and 
abnormal, healthy and pathological. 
It is noteworthy, then, that the recent DSM V 
actually leaves the labelling behind and opts 
for a trait-wise description (scaling of traits 
which then can be clustered or not). Is the 
logic underpinning the diagnosis of the disor-
der of ADHD here not generalized to the 
whole of the DSM? ADHD, as we know, is al-
ready a non-label, it only conglomerates cer-
tain behavioural traits (attention and activity 
levels) scaling them in an overt and explicit 
arbitrary manner. If this is, of course, coupled 
with a firm scientific claim, then it can surely 
be readily criticised as merely ―the classifica-
tion of trivia‖1; the truly remarkable issue, 
however, is that everybody knows this and re-
fuses to see anything problematic in it! Here, 
we might risk a bold step: the DSM actually 
has grasped what its critics are unwilling to 
admit: in the case of mental health and psy-
chic problems, there is nothing to under-
stand, nothing to grasp! This is what oppo-
nents of the DSM too often miss: for example, 
Kinderman et al., in their argument that ―dis-
tress is a normal, not abnormal, part of hu-
man life‖, contend that: 
The clients and the general public are negatively 
affected by the continued and continuous medi-
calisation of their understandable responses to 
their experiences; responses that undoubtedly 
have distressing consequences which demand 
helping responses, but which are better under-
stood as normal individual variation than as ill-
nesses (Kinderman et al., 2013, p. 2). 
While Kinderman et al. focus upon the realm 
of the understandable in everyday life, the 
DSM, albeit unwittingly, testifies to the do-
main of the non-understood, the domain of 
the non-understandable. And does not a mod-
icum of clinical experience reveal that it is 
precisely this non-understood and non-
understandable that forms a central part in 
psychic suffering, both on the side of the per-
son suffering, and on the side of the practi-
tioner solicited for treatment? What the 
mainstream critique shares with the basic 
paradigm of the neuropsy-sciences, then, is 
ultimately that which the novelist Jose Sara-
mago succinctly formulated as follows: ―we 
will know less and less what it means to be 
human‖ (Saramago, 2008). One way of putting 
this would be to suggest that we have also 
lost the idea of what is normal and what is 
not. Or, as the sociologist Doug Aoki wrote: 
… the ―normal body‖ is obese, the ―normal state 
of marriage‖ is divorce, ―reality‖ is something 
that you normally watch on TV, the ―normal ur-
ban vehicle‖ is an SUV, the ―normal conse-
quence‖ of retiring from a job you hate is dying, 
―normal teaching‖ is lecturing on material that 
                                                 
1 An expression I borrow from Christopher Lasch (Lasch, 
1978). 
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has already been articulated in much finer fash-
ion in a book by somebody much smarter (Aoki, 
2009, p. 3).2 
At the least such a description renders prob-
lematic any naïve and simple celebration that 
we are, in fact, finally, in these times of de-
construction, beyond the divide of normality 
and abnormality. Moreover, even when it is 
generally agreed upon that we have at last 
superseded the conception of a fully estab-
lished subjectivity, things might be not that 
simple after all. At first sight, now that we al-
legedly know that free will, altruism and even 
consciousness itself are but tricks of the 
mind, it does indeed appear that the Carte-
sian Ego is finally on its knees. But if we un-
dergo a closer examination of these discours-
es, it appears, in actual fact, that we lack the 
requisite courage to deliver the final death-
blow to subjectivity. For, precisely where we 
would not expect it, i.e., in the neuroscienc-
es, there is a strong but unacknowledged un-
dercurrent to restore the subject as a fully 
fleshed out agent; one situated, furthermore, 
beyond pathology, beyond abnormal and nor-
mal. That is, the main paradigm in current 
aetiology is that mental disturbances are 
grounded in the materiality of the brain. Or, 
phrased otherwise: if there is something 
wrong with you, it is your brain that is at 
fault. Does this not result in the production of 
another you, the you who is not to blame and 
surely, therefore, not have to feel guilty, em-
barrassed or awkward? This you can suffer 
from no pathology: the brain can, but not 
you, you are beyond normal or abnormal. Put 
differently: according to the neurosciences 
the subject does not lose track of itself, it is 
always on track; when it is off track, some 
brain lesion or dysfunction is present, or will 
be found. Hence, today‘s neurosciences, for 
whom there is nothing wrong with the sub-
ject, represent the ultimate attempt to save 
subjectivity, as they are creating, unknowing-
ly, a new version of the ego and the Cartesian 
cogito. 
                                                 
2 To add an everyday example: my stepson plays in a 
band and one day he said he had to make some purchas-
es: he needed a new guitar amp (his current amplifier 
apparently did not go loud enough anymore) and he 
needed to have custom-made earplugs instead of the dis-
posable ones he was using up until then. Annoyed with 
my joking remarks that the two issues might be connect-
ed, he said, ―Everyone I know playing in a band wears 
earplugs!‖ 
No archive images of the actual disaster 
The foregoing should make us cautious about 
succumbing to our almost automatic reflex to 
defend the subject against the supposedly 
massive objectifying tendencies of the neuro-
spy-discourses. That said, critical theorists 
and practicians should be acutely aware of 
what Foucault once said: ―People know what 
they do, they frequently know why they do 
what they do, but what they don‘t know is 
what they do does‖ (cited in Dreyfus & 
Rabinow, 1982, p. 187). In a similar vein, I 
would argue that critical discourses are al-
ways in danger of repeating the very thing 
they are allegedly opposing. To put it point-
edly: if one really wants to understand the 
more tricky and obnoxious turns of a dis-
course, one should take a look at the oppos-
ing discourses. 
To ground this strong assertion in something 
tangible, let me cite the example of a docu-
mentary movie I once saw screened during a 
conference. The film, An American in Aberfan 
by Chris Morris, was made as a commemora-
tion of a mining disaster in Aberfan (Wales, 
UK) in 1966. The abstract of the film runs as 
follows: 
A 60 minute documentary film about Internation-
ally acclaimed American artist Shimon Attie. Dur-
ing 2006 he worked with the people of Aberfan, 
to create an artwork to mark the 40th anniver-
sary of the Aberfan mining disaster. The producer 
and I knew the anniversary would be a media 
frenzy, so we began visiting the village in 2003, 
listening to their concerns about the approaching 
anniversary and trying to devise a film that would 
both satisfy the villagers and the needs of a tele-
vision company/television audience. We tailored 
our film to match the requests of the villagers. 
Firstly they requested that the film contain no 
archive images of the actual disaster. The 17 
other crews who filmed during 2006 all used the 
archive which so damages the village community. 
Secondly they wanted to ‗create' something to 
mark the occasion, and so we introduced them to 
the artist Shimon Attie. Thus Shimon's central 
role in this film as ‗the artist' working with the 
villagers is manufactured. In the finished film I 
concealed this fact – this was a film that managed 
to balance the ethical dilemmas of truth within 
documentary. Once again I was influenced by 
Werner Herzog's (Herzog on Herzog. Faber 2002) 
ideas of creating ‗ecstatic truths' rather than ‗lit-
eral truths' in film. The project addresses issues 
of representation, media responsibility and the 
exploitation of tragedy. The film also explores 
(with Shimon Attie) the tension and interplay be-
tween 'collective memory', history and storytell-
ing. The impact on the community of Aberfan has 
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been huge – it acts as a mirror to their grief and 
casts new light‖ (Morris, 2006a). 
One cannot, once again, be anything but 
sympathetic with the initial setup: it admira-
bly reacts against the vulture-like mainstream 
media wanting to rake over the same old sto-
ry. As the villagers themselves had already 
thought of marking the anniversary through a 
commemorative piece of artwork or sculp-
ture, Shimon Attie made a video installation 
portraying the villagers in their social or oc-
cupational role. In the words of the BBC news 
item on the artwork: ―The villagers "per-
formed" being themselves, while Attie filmed 
them on an unseen, slowly revolving stage‖ 
(Morris, 2006a). Or, as Shimon Attie puts it 
himself: 
I wanted the piece to confound our expectations 
and projections onto what it means to be a 'vic-
tim' or a 'survivor', and to resist easy interpreta-
tion and sentimentality (...) Ultimately, I wanted 
to create an artwork that - at least in the realms 
of the imaginary - might help Aberfan take its 
rightful place as a Welsh village among other 
Welsh villages (cited in Gabriel, 2008). 
However, are we not slowly drifting into po-
tentially problematic territory? By seeking to 
portray the villagers as they are, apart from, 
or beyond, the mining disaster, this not only 
risks charges of essentialism, it also invites a 
therapeutic if not overtly normalising agenda. 
Although it should be duly noted that Attie is 
well aware of these pitfalls, as he stresses 
that his artwork above all wishes to function 
in ―the realms of the imaginary‖, the ques-
tion is, then, what happens when the meta-
perspective is put in gear, that is, when the 
documentary maker comes in to mark and to 
lay down the event? One should, in this re-
spect, also keep in mind that Shimon Attie 
was brought in by the producer of the docu-
mentary who managed to get the BBC to pay 
for his stay. 
In an attempt to disentangle all of this let us 
return to the abstract of the film. One way to 
read it is to leave the antagonisms behind 
which the film maker himself puts forward 
(―truth within documentary‖, ―tension and in-
terplay between 'collective memory', history 
and storytelling‖), and focus on the other, 
visible, but not further developed, opposi-
tions. To begin with, there is the opposition 
between ―the villagers and the needs of a 
television company/television audience‖ (one 
could wonder why these differing needs 
should be reconciled at all). Secondly, and in 
connection with the former, the makers claim 
a difference between their documentary (art-
ful, serene and human) and the ―17 other 
crews‖ who, predictably and shamelessly, 
made abundant use of archive footage. But 
perhaps the central opposition overriding the-
se other concerns is: on the one hand, the 
artist Shimon Attie (the American outsider) 
and, on the other, the seemingly neutral, 
merely observing documentary film-maker 
himself. What leads us in the direction of see-
ing this as a basic opposition, is the rather 
strange argument in the abstract pertaining 
to the concealment of the manufactured role 
of the artist in the film (which the author jus-
tifies by referring to Werner Herzog). In a 
personal communication, Chris Morris indicat-
ed that he might have used some stylistic in-
felicities in the abstract. He explains that the 
artist was indeed invited but that the interac-
tion with the village was more a sort of ―or-
ganic and creative manufacture‖, which was 
not really ―concealed‖ in the movie but, ra-
ther, left out as this making-off-history was 
only a distraction from the main theme of the 
film. 
However, perhaps the film-maker proceeded 
a bit too hastily in the edit room and so we 
might be legitimated in our endeavour to read 
the abstract and its stylistic infelicities at 
face-value (in the Freudian tradition of 
you’ve said it anyway). For, as such, does not 
leaving out the fact that the film makers in-
vited the artist have the effect that we as-
sume that the documentary maker is an inde-
pendent party and, hence, a mere neutral 
and disengaged observer? To put it bluntly: 
what would make this little manipulation – for 
if we take things at face value, this is indeed 
what it is— any different from the reporter 
asking a child ―to cry for her dead friends be-
cause it would make a good picture‖ (as an 
Aberfan rescue worker recalled hearing a 
press photographe, see Wikipedia, "Aberfan 
disaster," 2013)? The obscurement of the fact 
that they hired and engaged the artist, thus, 
ultimately, risks confirming rather than dis-
proving the resemblances with the sensation-
seeking documentaries. By concealing the 
fact that he is working together with the art-
ist, the film maker acts fully in concordance 
with one of the basic principles of reality TV: 
cover up the fact that ―reality‖ is heavily 
scripted and artificially manufactured. 
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In this way, some of the peculiarities of the 
movie become clearer. In the beginning of the 
film, for example, we hear the familiar off-
screen voice announcing that the film fea-
tures people from Aberfan, many of whom 
which --at least so far as we are told-- have 
never spoken before on television about the 
incident. At once, it is difficult not to hear 
echoes of other trailers for more despicable 
sensation-seeking documentaries: we’ve got 
them to speak… The film then goes onto show 
the artist taking pictures and filming the vil-
lagers as they stand on a rotating platform 
striking poses from their everyday life. After 
which those people are brought in front of 
the camera of the documentary maker, 
whereby they speak in single words: ―horri-
ble‖, unimaginable‖… Are these answers to 
the question: could you describe the drama in 
one word? So, here we have, on the one hand, 
the American outsider, the artist who explic-
itly wants to do something else (he is asked to 
do so) besides revisiting the drama, while, on 
the other, on his tail, the documentary maker 
who in quasi-paparazzi-style asks: just one 
word, concerning the disaster; in one word, 
what do you feel? 
Furthermore, even when the documentary 
maker at the conference explained how he 
deliberately chose not to feature zoom-ins 
and, in fact, turned the camera off at points 
when people got overly emotional, one is left 
wondering if this desperate attempt to be dif-
ferent from other mainstream low-budget 
documentaries did not eventually lure him in-
to precisely the same paradigm. Indeed, how 
else can we view the recourse to a highly sug-
gestive and emotional music score, accompa-
nying the slow zoom-in to a photograph on a 
wall featuring one of the schoolgirls who died 
in the Aberfan disaster? Moreover, if, as 
Shimon Attie noted, Aberfan had indeed had 
enough of those old black and white images 
that had been showed a million times on TV, 
then why opt, in turn, for a minimalistic yel-
lowish colour palette that one usually associ-
ates with the 1960s and 1970s (Morris, 2006a) 
?3 Hence, it appears that even when so-called 
credible TV documentaries, in stark opposi-
tion to ordinary reality TV, refrain from show-
ing grand emotions and reject the cheap sen-
timentality offered by close-ups and other ed-
                                                 
3 For a fragment of the film see: 
http://vimeo.com/38499697 (Morris 2006b). 
iting techniques, there nevertheless remains 
an imminent risk that this will amount to an 
equally alienating aestheticization. After all, 
the objective of documenting and celebrating 
human resilience and the beauty of everyday 
life is, for all intents and purposes, reality 
television at its purest: it wants to show us 
the real, vibrating essence of human kind. 
The sensation-seeking gaze is substituted for 
a more refined, aestheticizing outlook; one 
that, moreover, closely resembles the aca-
demic and clinical psychological-
anthropological perspective. Does this consti-
tute the return of the body-snatchers, feast-
ing on human subjectivity? Subsequent to the 
screening of the film at the conference, the 
appointed respondent had a hard time pulling 
himself together: he had to excuse himself for 
getting so carried away. A large section of the 
audience evidently was equally moved: it was 
as if the veracity of the academic analysis of 
the human subject seemingly needed the 
tears of Academia for its validation. 
We should not mistake the emotionality de-
scribed above as merely accidental: rather, it 
is symptomatic of how Academia is trapped in 
an illusion that it can deliver the ultimate 
meta-perspective wherefrom a final, and thus 
solemn but also joyful and celebrative ac-
count of all things sublunary, can be given. 
Academia poses, then, as the consciousness of 
consciousness and in so doing obscures the 
fact that the ultimate consciousness can nev-
er be grasped (a meta-perspective always in-
vites a meta-meta-perspective). An American 
in Aberfan –which maybe should be renamed 
An Academic in Aberfan, as the American art-
ist is no more than one of the characters on a 
heavily-scripted theatrical stage— thus re-
jects disaster tourism only to end up portray-
ing an aestheticized, academicized glorifica-
tion of the tragic beauty of subjectivity. Not 
surprisingly, the real dirty underside, that is, 
the political socio-economic background of 
the Aberfan drama, was barely an issue in this 
documentary; no archive images of the actual 
disaster. The overall focus, rather, remained 
depoliticised and psychological; the communi-
ty was characterised as passing through a 
mourning process, seemingly having become 
pathological as ―the village's privacy was lost 
as the worldwide media descended‖, or to 
use the words used in the BBC-news item it-
self: the village had ―to cope with the trauma 
of its unimaginable loss in the glare of the 
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world's gaze‖ (Gabriel, 2008). The supposed 
depathologisation that the serene documen-
tary was to effect, via a process of aestheti-
cization, can be said to have faltered precise-
ly when Academia situated itself as the new 
gaze substituting for the prior gaze of the 
worldwide media. 
Where will Sally look for her marble 
What should we do with everyday life, with 
the real of human beings, with the real that 
human beings or communities experience? Is 
not the solution, here, to see people as com-
mentators, documentary makers, or even as 
plain scholars themselves? That is, instead of 
them having or making psychology, or display-
ing a beautiful resilience to be aestheticized, 
are they not making sense of themselves, of 
others, and the world as if they were theo-
rists and, above all, psychologists on their 
own account, deciding on their own normality 
and pathologies? To answer these questions, 
we should follow them right to their respec-
tive dead-ends; that is, as interesting as they 
are they all, I want to argue, overlook the 
subjective –and, concomitantly, the political— 
dimension. 
Let us hereto return once again to the neu-
ropsy-sciences in order to demonstrate how 
already there knowledge is given a central 
mediating role in terms of how the subject is 
present with itself, others and the world. 
Take for example a central argument of the 
American neuroscientist Joseph Ledoux per-
taining to how we come to feel emotions: 
―Emotional feelings result when we become 
consciously aware that an emotion system of 
the brain is active‖ (LeDoux, 1996, p. 302). 
Do we not have here precisely a peculiar 
splitting up of the subject? As in the Aberfan-
constellation: we are our own reality TV re-
porter/paparazzi: an emotion in our brain (an 
emotion system is active) needs to be probed: 
in one word, what do I feel? The basic idea is 
that we do not feel emotions directly; rather, 
there is a mediation (becoming conscious) in-
volved, a kind of translation of a real, prelim-
inary level, with the latter only directly ac-
cessible, allegedly, via science: 
Emotions evolved not as conscious feelings, lin-
guistically differentiated or otherwise, but as 
brain states and bodily responses. The brain 
states and bodily responses are the fundamental 
facts of an emotion, and the conscious feelings 
are the frills that have added icing to the emo-
tional cake (LeDoux, 1996, p. 302). 
According to Ledoux, the first reality is that 
of the material, raw flesh situated beyond 
logos, beyond discourse. Psychology, one 
could argue, comes later, as the icing on the 
cake. Or, to put it otherwise: if psychology is 
on the streets, then it arises from the brain; 
it is a product of neurons. Subjectivity is in 
this way secondary, and, as demonstrated 
earlier, it is consequently not the place where 
things go wrong: on the contrary, if there is a 
malfunction it originates not in the streets, 
but at the level of the brain; and even then, 
in the case of malfunction, as also aforemen-
tioned, the categories of normal, abnormal, 
healthy, pathological do not really apply, 
they only come in at a secondary level. 
But do we have to agree with this specific 
paradigm of subjectivity and psychology only 
being on the streets, being solely secondary 
issues? Do we have to accept that they are 
merely about becoming conscious of, giving 
words to things, the real things, happening in 
our brain? However, upon closer examination, 
it is evident that within neuropsychological 
discourses there is a fully established psycho-
logical agency to be discerned precisely at 
the alleged primordial level itself. Just con-
sider Ledoux‘s path of emotions: if the para-
digm runs that I become consciously aware 
that an emotion system of the brain is active, 
then this cannot but mean that subjectivity, 
in the form of the ―I‖, is the necessary primus 
movens. In other words, to explain the transi-
tion from the brain to the streets, the transi-
tion from the neuronal level to the realms of 
meaning, of subjectivity and society, invaria-
bly, but seldomly acknowledged, a form of 
primordial Cartesian unifying principle is pre-
supposed. 
To illustrate this further, the well-known 
―Theory of Mind‖-approach is especially use-
ful. David Premack and Guy Woodruff define 
Theory of Mind (ToM) as the ability to impute 
mental states to oneself and to others. This 
ability is said to be a crucial component of 
social skills as it allows us to make inferences 
about what other people believe to be the 
case in a given situation and allows us to pre-
dict what they will do (Premack & Woodruff, 
1978). Of course, the problem, readily over-
looked in the theory of ToM, is the paradoxi-
cal twist of a primordial reflexivity: one only 
has access to oneself via a theory of mind. 
But even when the ToM-approach tries to ac-
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count for the fact that one also theorizes 
about oneself, its problematic underlying as-
sumption remains that the human subject 
naturally is a theorizing and reflexive being, 
and that these natural capacities of reason4 
are put to work in an institutionalised and 
formalised way in science. In other words, to 
explain the genesis of the conception of a Self 
in the theory of ToM (a Self which would be 
the result of a Theory of Mind), one cannot 
avoid preconceiving a primordial Self who 
performs this operation. 
This is especially notable in the classic Sally-
Ann model for researching ToM with young 
children, in which the researcher seated in 
front of the child manipulates two dolls (see 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). The sce-
nario goes as such: firstly, the doll called Sal-
ly places a marble in her basket. When Sally 
leaves the scene, the second doll called Ann 
transfers and hides the marble in her own 
box. Then, as Sally returns, the experimenter 
asks the test subject ―where will Sally look 
for her marble?‖ Should we not immediately 
note here that, regardless of the actual re-
sults of the experiment, the child is put in an 
all-seeing and omniscient position, that is, in 
the position of the primordial Self? Moreover, 
the child is thus placed in juxtaposition with 
the test leader, the Big Other, pulling all the 
strings and manipulating the props on the 
stage. One might even put forward the hy-
pothesis that this is why young children tend 
to give the wrong answer (―Sally looks in 
Ann‘s box‖), as they generalise the omnisci-
ent perspective of the Big Other. However, 
let us resist the temptation to succumb to an 
alternative kind of psychologisation and, ra-
ther, attempt to discern here what could be 
said to be the basic scheme of Western sub-
jectivity: we have access to others, ourselves 
and the world via the mediation of the Other 
--be it God, the media or Academia. 
What, ultimately, seems to be enacted in 
both Ledoux‘s imagery of a second-level sub-
ject becoming conscious of what its brains 
feels, and the ToM imagery of a kind of Ar-
chimedean subject mirroring the Big Other, is 
a full, unproblematic and primordial subject 
ensuring its own existence in a Von Mun-
chausen tour de force. Even when, in the 
                                                 
4 The assumption that people spontaneously theorize is 
most often explained from an evolutionary perspective 
(Leudar & Costall, 2009). 
case of theory of ToM, it is argued that chil-
dren with autism suffer from a specific deficit 
at the ToM-level, one could argue that the in-
stance of the subject as a positive entity is 
still maintained: Simon Baron-Cohen et al. ar-
gue that the deficit children with autism show 
is ―a cognitive deficit that is largely inde-
pendent of general intellect‖ (Baron-Cohen et 
al., 1985, p. 44). The subject is saved. 
Against all these reifications of the subject 
the question becomes: is not the most human 
and subjective stance, contra Ledoux, not ex-
actly the loss of any emotion, to find oneself 
at the limit of feeling, or contra the theory of 
ToM to be at a total loss concerning what the 
Other knows or wants, and, consequently, 
what oneself knows or wants? The obstinate 
attempts to safeguard and to fix subjectivity 
cannot but lay bare a rift within subjectivity 
itself. Or, in the words of the Slovene philos-
opher Slavoj Zizek: 
The subject is correlative to its own limit, to the 
element which cannot be subjectified, it is the 
name of the void which cannot be filled out with 
subjectivization: the subject is the point of fail-
ure of subjectivization (Žižek, 2006, p. 254). 
For structural reasons, this scandal of subjec-
tivity can have no place in Academia. 
Conclusions 
Recently the newspapers reported on the pro-
gress made in the charting of our brain. We 
were shown two colourful brain scans, one 
supposedly depicting the mental state of 
―glad to see you‖ and the other of ―leave me 
alone‖. Life again seemed surprisingly simple: 
either I like you, or, I don’t like you –no 50 
shades of grey here. I like, I don‘t like: a Fa-
cebook neurology the relevance of which es-
caped me. But even if the newspapers were 
to present a more nuanced picture of the 
brain –drawing on more refined neuroscien-
tific research, for example– would Cathérine 
Malabou‘s question not yet still return with 
full force: what should we do with our brain? 
Although Malabou‘s book, thus entitled, 
above all poses this question in a straightfor-
ward way (what to do, personally and politi-
cally, with the plasticity of the brain), at a 
precise moment she gives it a more existen-
tialist twist. She writes: 
At one point we nonetheless have the feeling that 
we lack a future, and we ask ourselves, What 
good is having a brain, indeed, what should we do 
with it (Malabou, 2008, p. 11). 
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However, Malabou in fact does very little with 
that uneasy feeling of having a brain, that 
unbehagen that touches upon what Zizek re-
ferred to as the ―element that cannot be sub-
jectified.‖ One could recall here Andreas Ve-
salius‘ drawing of a skeleton holding a skull in 
its hand: in a strange way the skeleton exhib-
its a grand tristesse: what on earth should it 
do with the skull...5 
Could one not argue, then, that the current 
preoccupation with the fleshiness of the sub-
ject represents, above all else, a turn to real-
ity in order to escape the Real of the funda-
mental uneasiness related to the structural 
failure of subjectivation (as apparent at both 
the individual and the political level)? This 
would be in accord with the old propaganda 
rule: if nothing else works, tell the truth in 
order to deceive. The alleged turn to hard-
core materiality in the contemporary psy-
sciences is in this way the ultimate veil of 
their impotence to conceive of subjectivity. 
The vulgar materialism of ―we are our brain‖ 
obscures the fact that the human being, when 
adopting this lemma, calls into being another 
ghastly level, that of an agent holding its own 
brain in its hand, seeing it as a thing, looking 
at it from all sides, always with the tempta-
tion to drop the whole thing and see what 
happens then. 
This veiling of what is really at stake by wav-
ing the flag of reality reminds us of Theodor 
Adorno‘s seminal critique of astrology. Adorno 
argued that the obscure and blindly-accepted 
logic of the supernatural reflects the 
‗opaqueness and inscrutability‘ of social life 
under capitalism and its concomitant vicissi-
tudes (Adorno, 2001). Today the neuropsy-
sciences can be understood in the same vein. 
Consider, for example, Malabou‘s contention 
that ―the great metaphysical teaching of neu-
robiology today‖ is not to consider brain dam-
age as an isolated possibility, rare things that 
happen in hospitals, etc., but as a constant 
possibility (Malabou & Vahanian, 2008, p. 9). 
In other words, then, the neurological has re-
placed astrology, as it is also a lottery based 
on blind fate, which you can try to influence 
with magic powers, or by living healthy and 
                                                 
5 In contrast, Malabou seems to know what should be 
done regarding the brain (on the subjective level and on 
the political level): the brain‘s natural destiny is plastici-
ty and this should be rescued from capitalism‘s expropri-
ation of the brain‘s plasticity turning it into flexibility. 
eating the right stuff. We can lure our brains, 
so we are told, with brain exercises, neuro-
logical feedback, or via the manipulation of 
our eye movements. Even if the latter exam-
ples can be classified as misleading populari-
zations, they are still drawing upon what can 
be considered as a basic insight of the neuro-
sciences: that is, that we are always already 
lured by the brain in the first place (think of 
the tricks the brain is said to play on us, from 
visual and optic illusions it lures us into, to 
the illusions of the free will). But, yet again, 
even when formulated in this way the prob-
lematic spectre of the subject reappears: who 
is the I tricked by its own brain? 
Based on this, we can thus assert that the 
slogan of the people in the streets making 
their own psychology is, at least, not unprob-
lematic, as it once again redoubles the sub-
jectivities at play. Moreover, as I hope I have 
demonstrated, neither is the solution to think 
that we can directly address real people un-
touched by the varnish of psychologisation 
and neurologisation (in order to lay bare their 
true nature or their own knowledge, which 
we, the psy-scientists, could draw upon as a 
resource within Academia). And if those peo-
ple are, in fact, theorists of mind, they are 
certainly not lay or folk psychologists, whose 
amateur psychology is in need of some aca-
demic validation. Consequently, the well-
known Rom Harré and Paul Secord phrase ―for 
scientific purposes treat people as if they 
were human beings‖ (Harré & Secord, 1972, 
p. 84) should in this respect be reversed: for 
human reasons, treat people as if they were 
scientific (theoretical) beings. 
For, a critical stance that focuses on de-
psychologisation and depathologisation runs 
the risk of merely repeating a un-
emancipatory, naturalising discourse. In con-
trast we should not reject an, albeit differ-
ent, universalization, which is, due to the 
fact that we live in modernity and subjected 
to science, we are all the subjects of science. 
The emancipatory potential, here, lies in the 
fact that, as modern subjects we are not 
merely that which the sciences say we are (as 
when we are reduced to chemistry and phys-
ics, etc.). But, and this is the crucial point, 
this mismatch, or distance, should not be un-
derstood as an excess of nature or reality (the 
argument that the sciences will never be able 
to fully grasp the human). Rather, the excess 
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should be more fruitfully understood in the 
following terms: as science (potentially) is 
able to fully chart the human, this results in a 
left-over or a surplus --namely, the gaze of 
the baffled subject looking at itself being de-
termined. Put differently, if science tells us: 
this is (all) that you are, then this calls into 
life a new subject; or, to put it in the terms 
of Giorgio Agamben, the subject of one’s own 
desubjectivation (Agamben, 2002, p. 142). 
Modern subjectivity is therefore born at the 
horizon of knowledge of the sciences; it arises 
as a kind of surplus out of the question, what 
is it to be the subject of one’s own desubjec-
tivation. 
Thus, to reiterate, for human reasons, treat 
people as if they were scientific beings. It 
should be clear that it is at this very axis of 
subjectivation and de-subjectivation were the 
terms of normality and pathology can perhaps 
be rethought, precisely because this is also 
the very place where subjectivity is a social, 
and, above all, a political issue. 
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